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At this time of neoliberal austerity, standing on the brink of producing runaway 
climate change that threatens our futures, it seems irresponsible to continue the 
academic tradition of avoiding normative judgements of what is good or bad, 
life-enhancing or life-threatening, just or unjust. We have news media dominated 
by the super-rich, and a political class that is in thrall to a global plutocracy 
heavily invested in perpetual economic growth and fossil fuel use, and in denial 
of climate change. To stop carbon emissions exceeding the 2 degree Celsius limit 
we need rapid social change on an unprecedented scale, with massive economic 
restructuring and changes to ways of life; in particular, economic growth has to 
end in rich countries (Jackson, 2007). We need not only to draw attention to 
what’s problematic about the crisis we’re in, but also to think normatively about 
what a good life after growth could be like, and the kind of economic 
organisation that could support it. Unless, we have some idea of alternatives, 
critiques of the status quo are unlikely to have much traction. Here, I want to 
argue for moral economy as an approach that can contribute to this daunting 
task.  
 
Amartya Sen once distinguished between ‘engineering’ and ‘ethical’ approaches 
to economics (Sen, 1991). The former treats economies as machines that work in 
various ways that need to be described and explained, and which economists can 
fix if they work badly. The ethical approach treats economies as sets of social 
relations and practices that may be good or bad on moral and ethical grounds 
and need to be assessed in those terms. In the days of classical political economy, 
the two were seamlessly merged. However, thanks to the disastrous divorce of 
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positive (descriptive and explanatory) and normative thought following the 
emergence of separate disciplines in the social sciences, most researchers have 
become averse to normative reasoning, leaving this to political theorists, who 
return the compliment by discussing ideal models of distribution that ignore the 
injustices of actually-existing economic practices and situations (capitalism is 
rarely mentioned in such literature). Hence the work of the likes of Rawls or 
Dworkin or Sandel poses little or no threat to the established political economic 
order.  
 
The engineering approach’s dominance in economics and indeed political 
economy and economic geography is overwhelming. It is of course necessary to 
know how the economy works as a system - how, for example, the financial crisis 
of 2008 arose – and economic geographers have made important contributions 
to this task. Yet, even if the system ain’t broke, it may still be problematic in 
terms of justice and allowing people to flourish. 
 
In Marxism, the ethical critique is largely implicit, or absent among those who – 
in a variant of the positivist fact-value dichotomy – believe that science and 
ethics are radically different and incompatible, with the former (‘scientific 
socialism’) superior to the latter (‘humanist or ethical socialism’). They prefer to 
develop engineering critiques of ‘contradictions’ rather than get into critiques of 
injustice and oppression. On this view, ‘humanist’ or ‘ethical’ socialism is at best 
a substitute for poor logical thinkers. Defining exploitation just in quantitative, 
value terms may seem more ‘scientific’, but it doesn’t in itself tell us what’s 
wrong with it, namely that it takes unfair advantage of others and fails to treat 
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them as ends in themselves. This leaves us in a weak position for criticising 
existing institutions. 
 
‘Moral economy’ reinstates the ethical approach to economy. Like ‘geography’, 
the term can refer either to a kind of study or the object of that study. As a way of 
studying the world, it examines and assesses the moral justifications of basic 
features of economic organization, in particular property relations and what 
institutions and individuals are allowed and required to do. It also examines and 
assesses the moral influences on, and implications, of economic activities, and 
how economic practices and relations are evaluated as fair, unfair, good or bad 
by those involved in them. Wilson’s (2013) study of Cuban ‘everyday moral 
economies’ is a good example of these latter concerns, both documenting and 
assessing those lay evaluations. Moral economy treats the economy not merely 
as a machine that sometimes breaks down, but as a complex set of relationships 
between people, and between people and nature, increasingly stretched around 
the world, in which they act as producers of goods and services, investors, 
recipients of various kinds of income, lenders and borrowers, and as taxpayers 
and consumers.  As a critical approach it goes beyond the usual focus on 
irrationality and systemic breakdown, to injustice and the moral justifications of 
taken-for-granted rights and practices. It’s not only about how much people in 
different positions in the economy should get paid for what they do, but whether 
those positions are legitimate in the first place. Is it right that they’re allowed to 
do what they’re doing?  
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Once economic institutions and practices have become established, these 
normative questions tend to be forgotten, and a shift takes place from the 
normative to the normalised or naturalized (de Goede, 2005). Indeed, 
legitimations of the arrangements may scarcely be needed. Few economic 
institutions result simply from democratic deliberation about what is fair. Most 
are products of power. Thus, it is not questioned why workers have no 
ownership rights over the goods they make, or why shareholders who have 
acquired their shares second hand should have rights to dividends from and 
influence over companies despite having contributed nothing to them (the 
money they pay for the shares goes to the previous owner, not the company). 
Unless, we challenge such arrangements, they are likely to remain. As Habermas 
commented, through such normalisation, questions of validity are turned into 
questions of behaviour (1979, p.6). An engineering critique of capitalism might 
explain the role of the growth of the shareholder movement in the crisis and the 
preceding boom, but without in any way challenging the legitimacy of the basic 
property relation involved. Politics without ethics is directionless, while ethics 
without politics is ineffectual. Moral economy seeks to combine them. 
 
As an object of study, some have defined moral economies in opposition to 
market economies, as Edward Thompson famously did, but unlike him, though 
like many more recent users of the term, I regard all economies as moral 
economies in some respects (Arnold, 2001; Booth, 1994; Keat, 2012; Murphy, 
1994; Sayer, 2007; Thompson, 1971), for all invoke some sort of moral/ethical 
justifications for their key institutions. This is not to imagine that such 
justifications have much to do with the formation of such institutions, for this 
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typically depends on power, with justifications – usually of a utilitarian kind - 
primarily serving as rationalisations after the event.  Still, the very fact that they 
are largely products of power makes it all the more important to subject these 
justifications or rationalisations to critical assessment. 
 
Its definition of the economic is like that of economic anthropology and feminist 
economics: it refers to provisioning activities that to a greater or lesser degree 
enable people to live well (Ferber and Nelson, 1993; Polanyi, 1944). These 
activities extend beyond the money economy to unpaid labour, including care 
work, and gift relations. Capitalism is a peculiar form of economy in that 
provisioning is a side-effect rather than a goal; as a crucial characteristic it is an 
obvious target of critique.  
 
Provisioning involves two key kinds of relations: the social relations through 
which it is conducted (no-one ever got rich or poor outside these), and relations 
between people and nature, for as Marx saw, all material use-values are 
ultimately transformations of nature. To say we are social beings is to 
acknowledge our dependence on others. That dependence can take different 
forms - some, like care relations, life-enhancing, others, like slavery or usury, 
harmful. Conventional economics largely ignores both kinds of relation: political 
economy examines the first but rarely the second. These are forms of 
estrangement – problematic not only for both explaining economic phenomena 
and for evaluating them - but also in life. One of the reasons for this 
estrangement is the increasing stretching of both kinds of relation across space. 
As the division of labour has deepened and extended, it is less and less clear on 
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whom we are dependent as producers and consumers, and what the 
environmental impacts of our activities are. Ignorance of and indifference to 
others and to our metabolic relation to nature are the result. Geographers are 
better than most at acknowledging both kinds of relation, but I would urge it to 
take more notice of the moral dimension of economies.  
 
Nonetheless let me deal with one likely objection: For many readers, moral 
economy may sound strangely normative, taking us beyond what we as 
academics can and should do. Students of geography and social science learn to 
limit themselves to description and explanation, and to be cautious about saying 
what is good or bad about social phenomena, lest their tutors write ‘value-
judgement’ in the margin, or tell them that value-judgements are ‘subjective’, and 
penalise them accordingly. Yet evaluative judgements can be products of 
reasoning, and be about something (what behaviours and social practices enable 
people to flourish or suffer in this case), and assessed in relation to those things.  
The reasoning is often difficult and of course there are sometimes dilemmas and 
unresolved questions, but to imagine that evaluations are beyond reason and 
simply arbitrary makes no sense of how we live.  
 
Some, under post-structuralist influences, learn to associate normativity with 
‘normalising’ – telling others what they should do - and the ‘moral’ with 
repressive limitations on behaviour; they therefore censor themselves, and write 
in crypto-normative terms that cast the world in ominous tones, but fail to say 
what is problematic about it (Sayer, 2011). To be against normativity is to 
contradict oneself – like saying ‘it’s wrong to say anything is wrong’. Normativity 
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is not reducible to ‘normalising’ or telling others what they should do, as many 
tend to imagine. In positivist fashion, this re-casts the issues into an is-ought 
dichotomy. Of course moralities seek to prescribe what kind of behaviour is 
permissible, but they do so according to evaluations of what is just and conducive 
to well-being, though of course we may question whether they successfully 
identify this. Off duty, post-structuralists tend to be as moral as anyone else, 
indeed more so where the use of language is concerned. Sexism and racism, for 
example, are morally/ethically1 wrong because they arbitrarily and unjustly 
oppress those who are subject to them.  
 
Normativity is first of all, before any ‘oughts’, the evaluation of things, and both 
this and its recommendations are to be taken as such and not as authoritarian 
commands. The very meanings of good and bad are directly or indirectly related 
to our capacity, and that of other species, for flourishing and suffering. As living 
beings we can flourish or suffer in a host of ways, and these are states of being 
that require evaluative descriptions if we are to understand our situation. If you 
don’t know whether someone is starving or well fed, oppressed or free, 
stigmatised or valued, and know whether these states of being are good or bad, 
then you don’t know much about them. If I say millions of people are suffering in 
Syria, I’m making a claim that is both empirical and evaluative, and if you don’t 
know that suffering is bad, you don’t know what it is. Imagine going to see your 
doctor to have your blood pressure taken, and when you are given the two 
numbers, one over the other, and you ask whether it’s bad, the doctor said “ah, 
                                                        
1 I use ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ interchangeably here, to include all of what is generally associated 
with each term (Sayer, 2011).  
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that would be a value-judgement, and therefore of no scientific value”, you would 
think them mad. Yet many social scientists imagine that evaluative judgements 
are a kind of contaminant threatening objectivity. On the contrary, to do justice 
to our nature as living beings, capable of flourishing or suffering, and of living in 
oppressive and miserable ways or life-enhancing ways, we need evaluative 
descriptions of our states of being.  It is a mistake to think of values and 
objectivity as necessarily opposed. This is the shared error of conservatives who 
want to exclude values in order to allow objectivity, and radicals who accept 
values and trash objectivity (Sayer, 2011). 
 
Legitimations of economic institutions may appeal to criteria of need (e.g. for 
child benefit), or desert (how much people deserve to be paid in relation to what 
they contribute), or justice (about what is fair vis-à-vis comparable others, or 
exploitative, or oppressive), or, as in utilitarianism, to outcomes (not the 
relationships and processes that produce those outcomes). It would be hard to 
assess any economy without considering all these criteria, but we need to add 
environmental criteria too.  Boltanski and Chiapello (2006) have usefully 
identified some of the normative rationales for different forms of organization in 
capitalism, though they leave their evaluation of these implicit.  These 
legitimations and criteria matter to people. For example, surveys of views on 
economic inequality show that people are concerned not only about what 
individuals get in income, but what they contribute in terms of work (Orton and 
Rowlingson, 2007; Horton and Bamfield, 2009). Part of our job as academics is to 
assess these folk moral economic beliefs critically and improve upon them.  
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A key distinction in moral economy is that between earned and unearned income, 
the former being conditional upon contributing to the productions of goods and 
services, whether commodities or simple use-values, the latter being derived 
from control over existing key assets like land, property, technology, money that 
others need but lack (Sayer, 2014). Like any money, £1 million pounds in rent or 
interest or dividends has value only if there are goods and services that it can 
buy, so asset-based unearned income depends on producers (recipients of 
earned income) producing more than they can buy with their own pay. Property 
that is held not for its use-value but as a means for extracting payments from 
others or as capital gains was termed by J.A. Hobson ‘improperty’, an exploitative 
form of dependence; it’s ‘something-for-nothing’. Rent, interest, capital gains, 
and dividends are all forms of improperty, supporting functionless rentiers.  
Capitalist property in means of production, is also improperty, though unlike 
rentiers, their profit is at least dependent on its use for producing commodities.  
 
All these social relations are questionable from the standpoint of justice. For 
example, rather than take interest on debt simply as a fact of life, to be 
documented and analyzed just by an engineering approach, we need to re-
examine the ancient critiques of usury, which recognized it as a means by which 
the rich can take advantage of the weakness of the poor (Pettifor, 2006; Graeber, 
2011). Whether it’s pay-day loans or the Greek debt crisis, this simple insight 
still applies. We need to remind people of this continually. 
 
In ordinary life, as opposed to academic work, the big questions in life are 
normative ones of what to do for the best. To leave out the moral economic 
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critique and restrict ourselves to an engineering critique is to give capitalism an 
easy time. In the context of neoliberalism, austerity and impending runaway 
climate change, I have argued that it is particularly important that we engage in 
normative reasoning now. But while this starts with evaluation, we need also to 
work on ‘envisioning real utopias’, as Erik Olin Wright argues (Wright, 2010; see 
also Ruttenberg, 2013), in order to assess what alternative economic institutions 
are desirable and viable, according to criteria of justice, well-being, and 
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